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ESCAPING FEDERAL LAW IN 
TRANSNATIONAL CASES: THE BRAVE NEW 
WORLD OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION* 
DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III** 
What happens when U.S. federal courts close their doors to 
transnational cases? Recent Supreme Court decisions regarding 
personal jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, extraterritorial 
application of U.S. federal law, plausibility pleading, class action 
certification, and forum non conveniens pose substantial 
obstacles for transnational cases to be adjudicated by U.S. 
federal courts. The result of this is that plaintiffs are now seeking 
other law—U.S. state and foreign law—and other fora—
including U.S. state and foreign courts—to escape federal law 
and courts in order to plead transnational claims. This Article 
offers a first glimpse at a brave new world of transnational 
litigation where federal, state, and foreign courts compete 
through their courts and law to adjudicate transnational cases 
and regulate transnational activities. The Article also explores the 
impact that closing federal law and federal courthouse doors to 
transnational cases might have on state law, foreign law, and 
transnational law generally. After critically evaluating this new 
world of transnational litigation, the Article offers a framework 
for adjudication that focuses on jurisdictional rules and 
sovereign interests when resolving forum competition in 
transnational cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that you were a lawyer representing a plaintiff injured in 
a foreign country by a defendant arguably subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the United States. Where would you advise your client 
to bring suit? Of course, that decision would be made by comparing 
the substantive and procedural laws of various jurisdictions—such as 
the foreign place of injury with the place of domicile of the 
defendant—to determine where the most convenient and law-
favorable forum would be to bring your case.1 A rational litigant 
would shop among the various potential fora for the forum where 
 
 1. If this was a contract claim, you might also have to evaluate whether the contract 
has choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses and whether these clauses point to a 
favorable forum (and law) for your client. Should those clauses be valid and enforceable, 
you might not have much of a choice where you bring the suit. Should those clauses be 
void or nonexistent, your evaluation of the case would be the same as in the main text. 
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there is the highest likelihood of a favorable outcome and bring the 
suit there so long as litigation funding supported that choice.2 
At one time, your advice to the client would have probably been 
in many (perhaps most) transnational cases: “Sue in the United 
States.” As Lord Denning, arguably the most celebrated English 
judge of the twentieth century,3 famously opined, “As a moth is 
drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can 
only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”4 The 
argument is that even in a world of increasing globalization, plaintiffs 
would prefer to bring suit in the United States to take advantage of 
favorable substantive and procedural law that presents far greater 
potential for recovery than in other legal systems.5 
There are several reasons why a plaintiff would want to bring suit 
in a U.S. forum. First, U.S. substantive law is thought to be more 
generous than the laws of other countries.6 Second, U.S. procedural 
law—in particular, notice pleading, liberal discovery, and aggregate 
(class action) litigation—provides plaintiffs substantial leverage in 
pleading, proving, trying to a favorable verdict, and settling their 
cases.7 Third, U.S. damages law—especially punitive damages and 
substantial jury awards—present the potential for a windfall for 
plaintiffs or, at a minimum, significant leverage to encourage 
defendants to settle.8 For these and other reasons, a plaintiff in a 
transnational case would be expected to choose a U.S. forum to bring 
suit, if possible as a matter of jurisdiction, even in cases where the 
harms complained of occurred abroad and even in cases where the 
 
 2. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 383 (2006) 
(“The law regularly provides more than one authorized, legitimate forum in which a 
litigant’s claims may be heard. To shop among those legitimate choices for the forum that 
offers the potential for the most favorable outcome is the only rational decision under 
rational choice theory and game theory because forum shopping maximizes the client’s 
expected payoff.”). 
 3. J. Skelly Wright, Law and the Logic of Experience: Reflections on Denning, 
Devlin, and Judicial Innovation in the British Context, 33 STAN. L. REV. 179, 180 (1980). 
 4. Smith Kline & French Labs., Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A.) at 733 
(Eng.). 
 5. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Refracting Domestic and Global Choice-of-Forum 
Doctrine Through the Lens of a Single Case, 2007 BYU L. REV. 959, 971 (2007). 
 6. See Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International Forum 
Shopping, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463, 463 (2002) (“Typically our courts afford to foreign 
plaintiffs injured abroad lower barriers to suit and higher recoveries than other available 
forums would offer.”). 
 7. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence 
of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 301, 338–40, 338 
n.194 (2008). 
 8. See Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 
509, 511–12, 516 (2008). 
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evidence is located abroad. Specifically, you might counsel your client 
to sue in U.S. federal court and even under U.S. federal law, as 
federal courts and federal law have generally been seen as 
particularly hospitable to transnational cases.9 
In today’s world of transnational litigation, your advice to the 
client might be different. Generally speaking, U.S. federal courts are 
increasingly reluctant to adjudicate transnational cases.10 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made substantial refinements to 
doctrines such as personal jurisdiction,11 forum non conveniens,12 and 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law13 that pose 
substantial obstacles for filing transnational suits in U.S. federal 
courts, especially under federal law.14 Indeed, upon filing a case in the 
United States, a foreign plaintiff is particularly susceptible to having 
her case dismissed by a U.S. federal court in favor of a foreign 
forum.15 Similarly, the Supreme Court has also constricted pleading 
doctrine16 and made it harder to certify class actions.17 Taken 
together, these federal developments short-circuit many of the 
reasons why a plaintiff in a transnational case would be drawn to U.S. 
federal law and courts. 
Perhaps no better examples exist of this restriction of federal 
court access in transnational cases than the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum18 and Daimler AG v. 
 
 9. See Weintraub, supra note 6, at 463 (“The United States ranks first among the 
world’s magnet forums.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional 
Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1113 (2010); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum 
Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 483–84 (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2855 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011). 
 12. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007). 
 13. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 247 (2010). 
 14. One scholar has helpfully labeled these and similar doctrines as “transnational 
litigation avoidance doctrines.” See Pamela K. Bookman, Once and Future U.S. Litigation, 
in FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 35, 36–37 
(Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014) (describing forum non conveniens, forum selection clauses, 
comity, personal jurisdiction, and the political question doctrine as “transnational 
litigation avoidance doctrines”).  
 15. See Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient 
Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 165 (2012) (explaining the impact of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine on foreign plaintiffs). 
 16. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 555–56 (2007). 
 17. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011). 
 18. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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Bauman.19 In Kiobel, the Court held that a Nigerian plaintiff could 
not bring suit against a Dutch corporation under the Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”)20 for alleged human rights violations occurring in 
Nigeria.21 According to the Court, where the harms complained of 
occurred entirely abroad, the ATS does not apply unless the alleged 
tortious conduct “touch[es] and concern[s]” the territory of the 
United States.22 In Bauman, the Court held that Daimler AG, a 
German corporation, was not subject to general jurisdiction in 
California in a case alleging tortious activities committed by a 
subsidiary of Daimler AG in Argentina.23 Daimler AG was, according 
to the Court, in no way “essentially at home” in California because of 
its “slim contacts with the State [of California],” even though it had a 
subsidiary there subject to general jurisdiction.24 
These cases are just two examples of federal courts restricting 
plaintiffs’ access to U.S. federal law and courts in transnational cases. 
This emerging “restrictive ethos”25 to federal procedural and 
substantive law in transnational cases impacts not only cases filed in 
U.S. federal courts, which would be the expected outcome of such 
decisions. Importantly, it also affects plaintiffs bringing transnational 
cases in federal, state, and foreign courts generally. For instance, 
some plaintiffs are engaging in domestic forum shopping and 
intentionally avoiding federal procedural and substantive law by 
seeking to plead transnational cases under state law, in some cases in 
state courts in the very first instance.26 This forum selection raises 
complex issues regarding the allocation of judicial powers between 
 
 19. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”). 
 21. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 762. 
 24. Id. at 760, 762. 
 25. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 353, 368 (2010) (citing Iqbal and other recent cases as an example of an 
efficiency-focused “restrictive ethos in procedure [that] appears ascendant and poised for 
dominance”). I note that this restrictive ethos has been examined in significant detail in 
the context of domestic litigation. See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: 
Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 729–30 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified 
Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the 
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 291–92 (2013). This Article 
explores that ethos in the context of transnational litigation. 
 26. Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the 
Extraterritorial Effects of U.S. State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 539–40 (2012). 
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federal and state courts in cases where foreign affairs might be 
implicated. 
Even more interesting, some plaintiffs now actively avoid U.S. 
federal procedural and substantive law altogether. Instead, they file 
their claims in U.S. courts under foreign law and, in some cases, file 
claims in the first instance under foreign law in foreign courts.27 This 
raises an important question: Should U.S. courts take account of this 
development as they apply domestic legal doctrine in transnational 
cases, and, if so, how? 
Notably, plaintiffs engaging in transnational forum selection are 
seeing significant success filing suits abroad. On January 30, 2013, for 
instance, a trial court in The Hague announced that it had entered a 
judgment against Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 
a member of the Royal Dutch Shell group of companies, for 
violations of Nigerian law for harms arising from an oil spill in 
Nigeria.28 According to one commentator, this case “constitutes the 
first time that a Dutch multinational has been sued before a civil 
court in The Netherlands in connection with allegations of damage 
caused abroad by a subsidiary and appears to be part of a trend” 
whereby plaintiffs “from the developing world turn[] to the courts in 
developed countries for redress against multinationals.”29 In years 
past, this case would have been a prime candidate for filing in the 
United States, especially under the ATS,30 as the plaintiffs did in 
Kiobel.31 Today, it appears there is a comparative advantage in filing 
such cases in foreign fora, especially in Europe.32 
Plaintiffs seek out nonfederal law and fora because those fora are 
engaged in forum competition to adjudicate transnational cases. 
Foreign courts are developing their law, both procedural and 
 
 27. Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law 
Competition in Securities Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 132, 140 (2012). 
 28. David Jolly & Stanley Reed, Mixed Decision for Shell in Nigeria Oil Spill Suits, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/business/global/dutch-
court-rules-shell-partly-responsible-for-nigerian-spills.html?pagewanted=all. 
 29. Roger Alford, Dutch Court Issues Mixed Ruling on Shell’s Liability for Nigerian 
Environmental Claim, OPINIOJURIS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/05/dutch-
court-issues-mixed-ruling-on-shells-liability-for-nigerian-environmental-claim/. 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40–41 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 31. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013). 
 32. Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A 
Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 129 (2013). 
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substantive, to encourage forum shopping into their courts.33 We are 
thus at the very beginning stage of a brave new world of transnational 
litigation where domestic and foreign courts compete through 
domestic and foreign law, both substantive and procedural, to 
regulate transnational activities as part of a transnational law market. 
This new world of transnational litigation is largely driven by 
private parties and their lawyers, who are forum shopping for 
favorable substantive and procedural law. These efforts are also part 
of an ongoing movement not only to file transnational cases in U.S. 
state and foreign courts, but also to influence legal change in those 
fora.34 For instance, there is a movement in Europe to overcome the 
traditional reluctance to aggregate litigation in favor of allowing U.S. 
class-action-like devices.35 There are also increasing damages awards 
in foreign courts that similarly show at least some export of 
traditionally American robust systems for recovery.36 In short, we 
now have a transnational law market where domestic and foreign 
courts compete to adjudicate transnational cases and where private 
parties and their lawyers engage in efforts designed to encourage such 
competition. We are in the midst of a brave new world of 
transnational litigation where U.S. and foreign courts compete 
through their legal regimes for transnational cases. 
This Article explores the burgeoning brave new world of 
transnational litigation. The Article is divided into four parts. In Part 
I, the Article explains the emergence of a law market for 
transnational cases. The transnational law market concept identified 
herein illustrates how the transnational movement of goods, people, 
and commerce has created a transnational movement of law, both 
procedural and substantive. Part II examines the market in action. By 
analyzing the impact that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison 
v. National Australia Bank37 (involving transnational securities fraud) 
and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (involving transnational torts) 
have had on forum and substantive law choice, the Article shows how 
restricting access to federal courts encourages the migration of 
 
 33. See, e.g., R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 7–8 (2011).  
 34. See generally, e.g., Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. 
J. INT’L L. 165, 192–93 (2009) (highlighting European fora that are now instituting forms 
of punitive damages and multi-claimant litigation). 
 35. S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class 
Action Have a New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 912 (2012). 
 36. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(detailing a multi-billion dollar judgment entered against a U.S. company in Ecuador). 
 37. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
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transnational cases to other courts in search of more favorable law. 
Part III explores the contraction of federal substantive and 
procedural law generally and explains how that retrenchment further 
informs and enables the transnational law market. Part IV proposes a 
normative view of transnational litigation. Key to this view is that, as 
the name “transnational” denotes, cases touching on transnational 
legal issues should be subject to increased transnational regulation 
and cooperation between governments in light of sovereign interests. 
I.  THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW MARKET 
Before examining the federal doctrinal landscape that 
encourages forum shopping in transnational cases, it is important to 
reconceptualize the ways in which litigants and courts interact in such 
cases. In this Part, the Article explains that transnational litigants are 
active participants in a transnational law market. This Part explores 
the development of the transnational law market in three sections. It 
begins by describing the market for transnational law and identifying 
the conditions that make transnational forum selection possible. It 
next focuses on the strategic choices made by litigants in transnational 
cases in response to the substantive and procedural laws provided by 
different fora. After exploring these choices, this Part illustrates how 
litigant choice operates within a transnational law market where U.S. 
and foreign courts compete through their substantive and procedural 
laws for transnational cases. Understanding the operation of the 
transnational law market provides context for the exploration of how 
that market will respond to restrictive federal substantive and 
procedural law, which will be analyzed in Parts II and III. 
A. Is There a Market for Transnational Law? 
It is not surprising that litigants in transnational cases engage in 
strategic forum-selection behavior to maximize their chances of legal 
recovery.38 As one might recall from the first year of law school, 
substantial time is spent acculturating lawyers to the benefits of forum 
choice. In one’s study of civil procedure, for instance, students 
examine in exhausting detail doctrines such as subject matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, the Erie doctrine, and venue that 
impact forum choice and intersect with forum selection. While forum 
shopping is the equivalent of a legal “dirty word,” it is, in fact, “only a 
pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of 
 
 38. Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum 
Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2004). 
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jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his 
case can be most favorably presented; this should be a matter neither 
for surprise nor for indignation.”39 Federal civil procedure doctrines 
are designed to encourage the just and fair resolution of cases in light 
of the fact that parties engage in strategic behavior to find the forum 
where their likelihood of success is the greatest.40 
In the United States, especially in a purely domestic case,41 forum 
selection is a question of “where” a certain case should be localized. 
For instance, can a Virginia corporate defendant that does substantial 
business in California be sued in California for a tort committed in 
Virginia against a California domiciliary? At first blush, this would 
seem to be a question of personal jurisdiction—namely, whether the 
Virginia defendant has the requisite contacts with California to 
permit suit there.42 However, this can also be viewed a question of 
venue because if the Virginia defendant cannot be sued in California 
it most certainly can be sued in Virginia based on general 
jurisdiction.43 The case will be localized somewhere in the United 
States. “Where” in the United States is the only question. 
Importantly, there is a strategic question embedded within this 
jurisdictional question: Where would the plaintiff have the best 
chance of recovery under governing law? In other words, in which 
forum would the plaintiff have the best chance of success applying 
state choice-of-law rules to determine the substantive law 
applicable?44 Similarly, to the extent different fora employ different 
 
 39. The Atlantic Star, [1974] A.C. 436 (H.L.) at 471 (Eng.). 
 40. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986) (“Sobered by the fate of the Field 
Code, Dean Clark and the other drafters of the Federal Rules set out to devise a 
procedural system that would install what may be labelled the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which the 
preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through 
discovery.”). 
 41. By “purely domestic case,” I mean one that involves a U.S. plaintiff, a U.S. 
defendant, and allegations of harms occurring in the United States. 
 42. The test is now a modification of the well-known International Shoe test: a 
defendant must have the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state such that the 
assertion of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  
 43. See Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien 
Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2193 (2012) (“The 
rules governing personal jurisdiction and venue usually pose minimal obstacles to 
plaintiffs seeking to bring cases against U.S. defendants. Almost invariably, there will exist 
some state or federal jurisdiction (typically many) where a U.S. business defendant is 
amenable to suit.”). 
 44. See Whytock, supra note 10, at 488 (noting the connection between choice of law 
and forum shopping). As should be obvious, there is a domestic law market as well. See 
generally ERIN O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009) 
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procedural laws—for instance, notice pleading or plausibility 
pleading—the litigant will have to take these matters into account as 
well when choosing the optimal forum. 
Choice of law enters the equation because the several states have 
different choice-of-law rules. For instance, Virginia will, with limited 
exceptions, apply the law of the place of injury to the case (in this 
example, Virginia law).45 California, however, might apply Virginia 
substantive law, or it might apply California substantive law.46 To the 
extent Virginia and California substantive law materially differ, 
parties have an incentive to forum shop for the most favorable law. 
Furthermore, Virginia and California procedural law may differ. At a 
minimum, the background of the judge and jury will be different as 
between Virginia and California. These differences in substantive and 
procedural law encourage a plaintiff to shop between the laws and 
courts of Virginia and California, both federal and state, to identify 
the forum where the likelihood of success is the greatest. Principles of 
personal jurisdiction constrain this choice. 
While a plaintiff might seek a California court (federal or state) 
in hopes of finding a forum where her likelihood of recovery is 
greatest, that decision can be short-circuited by a defendant’s reverse 
forum shopping.47 For example, if the plaintiff can file the case in a 
California state court because there is personal jurisdiction there, 
then the defendant may remove the case from state to federal court to 
limit some of the strategic advantages of filing in the state court.48 A 
defendant might also move to transfer from one federal court to 
another.49 
As the preceding paragraphs explain, plaintiffs and defendants 
both engage in forum shopping for the forum where their relative 
 
(acknowledging that a law market exists amongst U.S. state and federal jurisdictions). The 
concern here is with the transnational aspects of the law market.  
 45. E.g., Jones v. R.S. Jones & Assocs., 431 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Va. 1993) (holding that the 
settled law in Virginia is to adhere to the place of the wrong standard). 
 46. E.g., Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 934 (Cal. 2006) 
(holding that conflicts of law are resolved “by applying the law of the state whose interest 
would be more impaired if its law were not applied”). 
 47. See Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens 
in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 501, 525 (1993) (“In reality, plaintiffs engage in forum shopping and 
defendants engage in reverse forum shopping, each seeking to turn to their own advantage 
the laws and procedures in the respective forums.”). 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (permitting a nonresident defendant to remove a case 
from state court to an appropriate federal court). 
 49. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1631 (2012) (allowing a change of venue for the 
convenience of parties and witnesses or for want of jurisdiction).  
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chances of success on the merits are greatest. In so doing, however, 
various procedural doctrines level the playing field to prevent a party 
from using the rules of the system to create an excessive and unfair 
litigation advantage.50 Importantly, domestic forum shopping is 
frequently about choice of law and convenience to the parties,51 as 
relative procedural uniformity throughout the several states discounts 
many of the reasons for domestic forum shopping.52 Transnational 
cases, however, present different strategic choices for litigants.53 To 
understand why a plaintiff would be drawn to U.S. courts in a 
transnational case, one must understand the traditional advantages 
offered to a foreign plaintiff by U.S. substantive and procedural law. 
First, U.S. courts allow extensive pretrial discovery controlled by 
the parties and not the court. In most other legal systems, pretrial 
discovery is limited.54 As such, U.S. courts give plaintiffs significant 
advantages to force settlements through the threat of discovery.55 
Such discovery also gives plaintiffs a greater ability to prove their 
cases by giving them access to information.56 Second, it is believed 
that U.S. courts grant and approve higher damages awards than 
foreign courts, particularly in cases that are tried to a jury.57 U.S. law 
recognizes categories of compensatory damages, such as damages for 
emotional distress or pain and suffering, that are not generally 
 
 50. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The 
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1918 (2008) 
(describing the various responses to forum shopping in the history of American procedural 
law). 
 51. Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative 
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1753, 1791 (2012). 
 52. See Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, 
and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2008) (describing uniformity 
of procedural law in the United States). 
 53. See Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, 
International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 567–68 (2002) (noting the 
impact of choice-of-law doctrine on international forum shopping and arguing that it is 
stronger than the impact on domestic forum shopping). 
 54. E.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823, 830–31 (1985) (explaining the differences between discovery in the United 
States and Germany). 
 55. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil 
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 551 (2010) (analyzing this belief through empirical 
data). 
 56. Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. 
REV. 465, 474 (2012). 
 57. See Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflicts-of-Laws Problems in 
Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 152–53 (stating that foreign parties flock to 
the United States for a variety of reasons, including “the American jury and its open-
hearted generosity”). 
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recognized abroad.58 U.S. law also provides for punitive damages, 
which are rejected in most other legal systems.59 Third, U.S. courts 
permit class actions that cannot be brought as aggregate cases in other 
countries.60 In these cases, which can involve many thousands of class 
members, potential liability for defendants is amplified, providing 
significant incentives for settlement. Finally, U.S. lawyers are able and 
willing to represent plaintiffs on contingent-fee arrangements. Such 
arrangements are generally not permitted in other countries.61 
Plaintiffs in the United States are also not subject generally to a 
“loser pays” system, allowing lawyers and plaintiffs to bring claims 
that may not be successful without the fear of bearing both sides of 
litigation costs.62 
For each of these reasons, U.S. courts, both federal and state, 
present a compelling choice for plaintiffs in transnational cases. These 
substantive and procedural advantages also illustrate why defendants 
would prefer to avoid litigation in the United States. 
Perhaps no better example of the lengths that a defendant will go 
to escape U.S. courts and law (and the lengths a plaintiff will go to 
escape foreign courts and law) is presented in the classic case of Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,63 which applied the forum non conveniens 
doctrine in the transnational context.64 In that case, a representative 
of the estates of several Scottish citizens brought a wrongful death 
action in California state court against two American defendants who 
had manufactured the engine and propellers of a plane that crashed in 
Scotland.65 All victims of the crash were Scottish citizens, as were 
their next-of-kin.66 A Scottish lawyer referred the next-of-kin to a 
plaintiff’s air-crash lawyer in California, who arranged to have a 
 
 58. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering 
Awards, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 418 (2006) (finding quantitatively that U.S median 
recoveries for non-compensatory damages are “enormously larger” than in European 
courts). 
 59. See John Y. Gotanda, Essay, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive 
Damages: Is the Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510 (2007) (“Most 
civil law countries limit recovery of damages in private actions to compensatory 
damages.”). 
 60. See generally Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 
28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 173 (2010) (discussing the differences between the U.S. and 
European legal and procedural backgrounds). 
 61. Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1551, 1555 (2012). 
 62. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 187–234 (1988). 
 63. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 64. Id. at 238. 
 65. Id. at 239–40. 
 66. Id. 
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probate court in Los Angeles appoint his legal assistant, Gaynell 
Reyno, as the administratrix of the estates of some of the deceased 
passengers.67 Reyno, an American citizen domiciled in California, 
instituted wrongful death litigation in state court in Los Angeles.68 
The defendants removed the case to a California federal court 
and then transferred the case to a Pennsylvania federal court, where 
they then moved for dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.69 
The district court granted dismissal in favor of a Scottish forum and 
the Third Circuit reversed, finding that dismissal was inappropriate 
because Scottish law was less favorable to the plaintiff’s case.70 Even 
though the plaintiff would be disadvantaged by limited recovery 
before a Scottish court, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit 
and held, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, that various public and 
private interest factors could displace a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a 
U.S. forum.71 
What makes this case such a good example of the transnational 
law market is how it illustrates the ways in which both plaintiffs and 
defendants engage in forum shopping. For the plaintiff, California 
state courts were chosen as the forum to bring their case because the 
substantive and procedural law of California was significantly more 
favorable to them than the substantive and procedural law of 
Scotland.72 For the defendants, it was understandable that they would 
want to have the case heard in Scotland, as that is where the accident 
happened. They also wanted to have the case heard in Scotland in 
light of the fact that Reyno would not be able to pursue the cause of 
action there, because only next-of-kin could bring wrongful death 
actions.73 Additionally, “the plaintiff’s lawyer could not practice law 
in Great Britain,” the “litigation in Scotland would not include 
American-style discovery,” and, perhaps most significantly, “Scottish 
courts would not permit recovery of damages for anguish and would 
not employ American tort theories of liability.”74 
It was probably clear to all involved that a forum non conveniens 
dismissal would effectively seal victory for Piper and Hartzell. Indeed, 
after the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, “apparently no 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. For a wonderful description of the case, see Richard D. Freer, supra note 5, at 
971–72. 
 69. Piper, 454 U.S. at 238–40. 
 70. Id. at 238. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 240. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Freer, supra note 5, at 972.  
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suit was ever brought against the American manufacturers in Great 
Britain concerning this crash; evidently no lawyer thought the 
potential recovery worth the effort.”75 
This case illustrates why plaintiffs would want to forum shop into 
the United States in this particular case. The case, however, also 
shows how fora may compete for legal business. For California to 
permit such suits even when it has limited or no interest in the case 
illustrates that California is competing for legal business by creating 
opportunities for suits that do not exist elsewhere. For courts and 
litigants to view a legal system in this way illuminates that law is more 
than just a framework for adjudication; it is a market. Defining this 
transnational law market is the subject of the next section. 
B. Defining the Transnational Law Market 
In light of the above considerations, transnational litigation can 
be viewed as operating within a market for goods, where the goods 
are legal recovery. As Erin O’Hara and the late Larry Ribstein 
explain in their foundational book The Law Market, the market for 
law contains the following elements: 
First, there must be some significant demand for alternative 
laws as evidenced by parties’ ability and willingness to take the 
necessary steps to avoid undesired laws and to select the laws of 
other states. Second, some states must be willing and able to 
supply the desired laws. Third, political forces must respond to 
enhanced choice . . . . Fourth, federal statutory or constitutional 
law may play a role in the competition by either facilitating or 
hindering party choice.76 
Put in slightly different terms, on the demand side, plaintiffs seek law 
that meets their need for convenient, swift, and substantial recovery. 
As explained above in Part I.A, we have already seen the ways in 
which forum shopping illustrates the demand side of the transnational 
law market. 
However, there is another side to the story—the supply side. 
States may compete to offer legal actors what they want. This means 
that parties engage in forum shopping in light of the fact that different 
jurisdictions compete for law and legal services. Forum shopping by 
litigants and forum competition by legal systems go hand in hand.77 
 
 75. Id. (citations omitted). 
 76. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 44, at 166. 
 77. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A 
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2003) (understanding markets 
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There would be no reason for a party to undertake the Herculean 
efforts to shop between various jurisdictions if fora did not craft 
different legal rules. Different legal rules may be the result of 
happenstance in legal culture or concerted efforts on the part of fora 
to compete for legal business.78 They may also be the result of judges 
in individual cases seeking justice for plaintiffs through expansive 
application of legal doctrines or even the result of judges wishing to 
cultivate prestige or reputation in hearing such cases.79 These reasons 
create a supply side in the transnational law market. 
Historically, the potential for a transnational law market was 
quite limited. A plaintiff injured in one nation would only have the 
law and the courts of that nation, regardless of their benefits or 
disadvantages, to bring her case. This was so because travel and 
financial limitations constrained a plaintiff’s ability to file a case in a 
foreign jurisdiction. In today’s world of increasing globalization, there 
is significant movement of goods, people, and services across borders. 
Transnational litigation “is now a sophisticated multi-billion dollar 
industry[] driven by the globalization of business and the possibility of 
securing an enormous money judgment against a multinational 
corporation.”80 
Today, a party can forum shop for law transnationally in the 
same way that it would shop for any other good or service.81 Indeed, a 
party might even be encouraged to forum shop because third parties 
engage in litigation financing.82 Litigation financing enables forum 
competition by increasing the mobility of the parties and their ability 
to shop for law.83 For example, a plaintiff injured in Nigeria by a 
Nigerian corporation would be expected to bring her case in Nigeria 
under Nigerian substantive and procedural law. Today, that same 
 
“requires an understanding of both supply and demand conditions in order to identify the 
resulting equilibrium”). 
 78. See, e.g., Daniel Klerman & Greg Reily, Forum Selling 8 (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. for L. 
and Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. 14-44, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538857.  
 79. See id. at 25, 38. 
 80. Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and the 
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459, 
502 (2013). 
 81. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 44, at 1. 
 82. Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE/CNNMONEY 
(June 28, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-
piece-of-this-lawsuit-2/. 
 83. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class 
Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306 (2011) 
(providing an overview of this phenomenon in the context of transnational class actions). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015) 
1010 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
party may be able to bring suit against a Nigerian domiciliary in 
another country where that domiciliary has contacts or where its 
agents and affiliates have contacts,84 especially if the party can obtain 
litigation financing.85 
The basic idea is that “[j]urisdictions compete to offer legal rules 
and adjudication procedures that attract users.”86 The jurisdiction 
benefits from this competition by “franchise and other taxes, fees for 
lawyers and other professionals, private sector opportunities for 
government officials and judges, and collateral benefits for other 
businesses in the jurisdiction such as banks and broker-dealers.”87 To 
return again to the Dutch example, the Dutch courts must signal that 
they are open and willing to hear cases involving transnational torts. 
In other words, they must show plaintiffs that they will supply 
recovery if it is sought there. In sum, litigant demand and 
jurisdictional supply connect to help the transnational litigant localize 
her case. 
Legal and political forces giving plaintiffs enhanced forum choice 
also play a role in the transnational law market.88 The next Part 
investigates these areas. 
II. THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW MARKET IN ACTION 
This Part illustrates the development of the transnational law 
market by examining recent court decisions closing U.S. federal 
courthouse doors to transnational cases. It examines the operation of 
that market through the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank, which held that the anti-fraud provisions of 
federal securities laws do not apply to allegations of fraud occurring 
on foreign exchanges.89 After explaining that decision and its 
aftermath, which encouraged the filing of securities claims in state 
and foreign fora, this Part applies the transnational law market 
concept to other areas of law. As to the ATS in particular, this Part 
points to the impact that the Supreme Court’s recently issued decision 
 
 84. David Jolly & Stanley Reed, Mixed Decision for Shell in Nigeria Oil Spill Suits, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/business/global/dutch-
court-rules-shell-partly-responsible-for-nigerian-spills.html?pagewanted=all. 
 85. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on 
Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 161–63 (2011); Maya Steinitz, 
Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 
1282 (2011).  
 86. Kaal & Painter, supra note 27, at 144.  
 87. Id. 
 88. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 44, at 166. 
 89. 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). 
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in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, which limited the ability of 
foreign plaintiffs to bring transnational tort claims in the United 
States for injuries occurring in a foreign country,90 may have on the 
transnational law market. 
A. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Federal Law 
A key part of the transnational law market is that “political 
forces must respond to enhanced choice” and that “federal statutory 
or constitutional law may play a role in the [law market] by either 
facilitating or hindering party choice.”91 This subpart describes how 
the Supreme Court has responded to the transnational law market in 
interpreting the federal securities laws by holding that those laws, and 
federal law in general, are presumed not to apply extraterritorially. In 
so doing, this subpart is divided into three sections. First, it describes 
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Second, it examines the 
presumption’s application in the Morrison case. Third, it examines the 
impact that case has had on the filing of transnational securities 
claims. Parts II.B and II.C then take up the question of the Morrison 
decision’s impact on other federal laws. 
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Congress clearly has the power to enact legislation that applies to 
conduct outside the United States.92 However, courts seek to construe 
ambiguous federal statutes to avoid “unreasonable interference with 
the sovereign authority of other nations”93 that would result from the 
extraterritorial application of federal law. Courts have developed a 
presumption that U.S. federal law is not to apply extraterritorially 
absent a clear indication of congressional intent to the contrary.94 
“[U]nless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly 
expressed,” in “the language [of] the relevant Act,” federal courts 
presume a statute does not apply to actions arising abroad.95 The 
presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to protect against 
 
 90. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 91. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 44, at 166. 
 92. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress 
has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United 
States.”). This view comports with international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1986) (noting that a state has 
prescriptive jurisdiction over its own nationals and conduct that threatens its national 
security or is intended to have an effect within its territory). 
 93. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). 
 94. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. 
 95. Id. (citation omitted). 
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unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations 
which could result in international discord.”96 
The presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
federal law has a long pedigree. In an opinion written by Justice 
Joseph Story in the early 1800s, holding that federal customs statutes 
could not be extended to foreign vessels outside U.S. waters, the 
Supreme Court explained that “[t]he laws of no nation can justly 
extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own 
citizens.”97 Reaffirming this view in the early 1900s with a slightly 
different formulation, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed, in 
refusing to apply the Sherman Act to the actions of a U.S. company in 
Costa Rica, that there was a “general and almost universal 
rule . . . that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”98 
In the late twentieth century, after some years of uncertainty,99 the 
Supreme Court, in an opinion by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
rejecting the application of Title VII to alleged employment 
discrimination against an American citizen occurring abroad, 
resuscitated the doctrine in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 
Company (Aramco).100 The Court explained that it is a “longstanding 
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.”101 This limitation exists because 
“unless there is an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly 
expressed” to give extraterritorial statutory effect “we must presume 
it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”102 Based on these 
cases, the presumption does not apply where there is “an affirmative 
intention of the Congress clearly expressed” to extend the statute 
extraterritorially.103 
The presumption requires that Congress, rather than the courts, 
address any extraterritorial application of U.S. law in the first 
instance: 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824). 
 98. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). 
 99. See, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959); 
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 573 (1953). 
 100. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
 101. Id. at 248. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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For us to run interference in such a delicate field of 
international relations there must be present the affirmative 
intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the 
facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy 
decision where the possibilities of international discord are so 
evident and retaliative action so certain.104 
The field is “delicate” because application of U.S. law to conduct on 
foreign soil “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign 
nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial 
affairs.”105 Because “the presumption [against extraterritoriality] has a 
foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the laws of 
other nations,”106 it is not limited to situations where “there is a risk of 
conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.”107 
The presumption is, however, simple to state but hard to 
operationalize because what it means to be an extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law is uncertain, especially when a U.S. 
domiciliary or some conduct or effect in the United States is at issue 
in a case. In other words, the very first question for a court to resolve 
is whether there is an extraterritoriality problem presented by the 
case at all. The next section explores how courts apply the 
presumption today. 
2. Applying the Presumption: Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court 
addressed the extraterritorial reach of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, specifically section 10(b) of that Act and Rule 10b-5, which 
create liability for fraudulent activities in connection with securities.108 
National Australia Bank (“NAB”) was headquartered in Australia 
and its shares traded on the Australian Securities Exchange as well as 
other foreign exchanges.109 NAB had American Depository Receipts 
 
 104. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957); see also, e.g., 
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21–22 (1963) 
(acknowledging that Congress must give U.S. courts express authority to decide certain 
matters regarding international maritime law). 
 105. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004); see also, 
e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (asserting the presumption that Congressional legislation is 
meant only to apply within the territorial United States “serves to protect against 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in 
international discord”). 
 106. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993). 
 107. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
 108. Id. at 261–65. Personal jurisdiction was apparently not raised before the courts. Id. 
 109. Id. at 251. 
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(“ADRs”) listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).110 
NAB purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc., a Florida mortgage 
servicing company, which received fees for servicing mortgages.111 
The future income from the servicing contracts was calculated into 
NAB’s balance sheet.112 However, in July 2001, NAB announced that 
it would be taking a $450 million write-down based on the decreased 
value of those estimates.113 In September of that same year, NAB 
took another write-down of $1.75 billion.114 Following those write-
downs, NAB’s share price fell substantially.115 
Seeking to avail themselves of favorable U.S. law, a class of 
Australian plaintiffs, who purchased shares of NAB on an Australian 
stock exchange, brought suit under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
alleging that NAB “knowingly used unreasonably optimistic 
valuation assumptions or methodologies” in their calculation of the 
revenue the mortgage servicing fees would bring in.116 The plaintiffs 
sued NAB and other defendants in New York federal court and 
claimed, under then-existing Second Circuit precedent, that the 
involvement of the U.S. subsidiary justified the application of section 
10(b).117 
The district court dismissed the case on the basis that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction because the acts in the United States were 
“at most, a link in the chain of a scheme that culminated abroad.”118 
On appeal, the Second Circuit also dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under its “conduct” and “effects” tests.119 These 
tests were the predominant approach for analyzing the extraterritorial 
application of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws 
up until the Morrison decision.120 
The “effects” test, first announced in Schoenbaum v. 
Firstbrook,121 looked to whether the wrongful conduct had a 
substantial effect within the United States or on a U.S. citizen.122 The 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 252. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 172. 
 119. Id. at 171–76. 
 120. See Merrit B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 1173, 1232 (2012). 
 121. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 122. Id. at 206–09. 
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“conduct” test accepted an extraterritorial reach of the securities laws 
if foreign investors were harmed by conduct arising from the United 
States.123 Applying these tests, the Second Circuit determined that 
there was not subject matter jurisdiction because the acts occurring in 
the United States did not comprise “the heart of the alleged fraud.”124 
According to the Second Circuit, the heart of the fraud was 
Australia.125  
Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that the 
language of section 10(b) overcame the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.126 Speaking for the Court, Justice Scalia’s opinion 
found on the merits127 that no statutory language expressed 
Congress’s clear intention to have section 10(b) apply outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.128 The Court rejected the 
“conduct” and “effects” test and instead opted to adopt a 
transactional approach.129 In order for 10(b) to apply, the security 
must be listed on a domestic (U.S.) exchange or the transaction must 
be domestic.130 Therefore, a valid 10(b) claim can arise only for shares 
traded on a U.S. exchange or a transaction occurring within the 
United States.131 Since NAB shares were not listed on a domestic 
exchange, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6).132 
Importantly, the language of the opinion clearly expands the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to all federal statutes. 
According to the Court, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of 
an extraterritorial application, it has none.”133 Thus, for any federal 
statute to overcome this presumption, Congress must clearly state its 
intention for the statute to apply abroad. 
This statement of the presumption presents a question at the 
very heart of the case: When are the securities laws (or any other 
federal statute) being applied extraterritorially? For instance, what if 
 
 123. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336–37 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
 124. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 175–77. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 262–64 (2010). 
 127. By resolving the case on the merits, the Court disclaimed that this was a matter of 
subject matter jurisdiction, thus continuing a recent trend to separate subject matter 
jurisdiction from the merits. 
 128. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264–65. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 266–67. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 273. 
 133. Id. at 255. 
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a major portion of the fraudulent activity occurred in the United 
States even though it was directed to Australia? In fact, the plaintiffs 
in Morrison argued as much. The plaintiffs “contend[ed] that they 
[sought] no more than domestic application anyway, since Florida is 
where HomeSide and its senior executives engaged in the deceptive 
conduct of manipulating HomeSide’s financial models,” and because 
other misleading statements were made in Florida.134 
To answer this argument, the Court provided an additional gloss 
on the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
by requiring courts to look to the “focus” of the statute they are 
applying to determine its reach. In the securities context, the Court 
held that “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where 
the deception originated, but upon the purchases and sales of 
securities in the United States.”135 The Court then turned to the 
language of the Exchange Act, observing that “the objects of the 
statute’s solicitude” were “transactions in securities listed on domestic 
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.”136 
According to the Court, “[i]t is those transactions that the statute 
seeks to regulate [and] it is parties or prospective parties to those 
transactions that the statute seeks to protect.”137 
In sum, the Court acknowledged that plaintiffs had alleged some 
U.S. activity, but this did not make their proposed application of 
10(b) domestic rather than extraterritorial. In the Court’s view, “it is a 
rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all 
contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption 
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog 
indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is 
involved in the case.”138 
The benefit of the Court’s approach is the advantage of a bright-
line rule as opposed to a case-specific approach. However, requiring 
courts to look at the “focus” of each federal statute in the process of 
conducting an extraterritoriality analysis presents the possibility of 
circuit splits developing in many areas of law where the 
extraterritorial application of federal law is challenged. This is so 
because different federal courts might view the focus of a federal 
statute differently, depending on the context of the case. As such, the 
Supreme Court has not given the final word on the extraterritoriality 
 
 134. Id. at 266. 
 135. Id. at 249. 
 136. Id. at 267. 
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analysis, and there is reason to believe that the Court will have to 
take up other extraterritoriality cases in the years to come. Litigation 
following Morrison confirms that a statute’s “focus” can be hard to 
ascertain. 
3. Morrison’s Impact on Transnational Securities Cases 
Following the Morrison decision, another round of forum 
shopping in transnational securities cases began. In the Morrison case 
itself, the plaintiffs refiled their action in Australia. The case was later 
settled.139 In other securities cases, plaintiffs sought to escape the 
Court’s precise holding by pleading that there was a U.S. nexus under 
federal law or that a cause of action was available under U.S. state 
law. Plaintiffs also began to seek out foreign fora. Each of these 
developments is discussed in turn. 
Federal Law. Plaintiffs focused generally on two different 
theories to escape the presumption against extraterritoriality 
announced in Morrison when pleading federal law in securities fraud 
cases. The first strategy focused on shares being “listed” on a 
domestic exchange, even though they are not traded domestically. 
Under Morrison, section 10(b) applies to “the purchase or sale of a 
security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or 
sale of any other security in the United States.”140 One way to read 
Morrison is that if shares are listed in the United States, then the 
statute is not being applied extraterritorially and the presumption 
does not apply.141 Under the listing theory, plaintiffs argued that any 
security that is registered and listed with a domestic exchange 
survives Morrison.142 However, a number of courts have rejected this 
interpretation.143 
 
 139. Email from George T. Conway III, Wachtel, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to author 
(Jan. 28, 2014) (on file with author) (email from counsel for NAB confirming the 
settlement). 
 140. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. 
 141. Other theories have also been put forward. See, e.g., Wu v. Stomber, 883 F. Supp. 
2d 233, 240 (D.D.C. 2012) (arguing that the EURONEXT exchange is actually American 
because it is owned by a Delaware corporation), affirmed by 750 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
MVP Asset Mgmt. v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483-GEB-CKD, 2012 WL 2873371, at *5–6 
(E.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (arguing that transferring funds between New York-based 
banking institutions establishes a domestic transaction). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 143. See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 
330–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 525; In re Infineon Techs. AG 
Sec. Litig., No. C 04-04156 JW, 2011 WL 7121006, at *3, *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011). 
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The second strategy sought to create an implication of a domestic 
transaction when the purchase order is submitted from the United 
States even though the ultimate purchase occurs on a foreign 
exchange. Here again, plaintiffs sought to escape the presumption by 
pleading a domestic condition. The main argument surrounds the 
application of the Morrison language holding that section 10(b) suits 
are appropriate “whether the purchase or sale is made in the United 
States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange.”144 
However, many courts have held that “[section] 10(b) would not 
extend to foreign securities trades executed on foreign exchanges 
even if purchased or sold by American investors, and even if some 
aspects of the transaction occurred in the United States.”145 District 
courts appear disinclined to subject purchases on foreign exchanges to 
section 10(b) merely on the basis of a purchase order signed in the 
United States.146 However, a recent court of appeals decision has 
cracked the door open for domestic plaintiffs.147  
To be clear, plaintiffs also face substantial procedural obstacles 
to pleading transnational securities actions in federal courts when the 
fraud complained of occurred abroad. In Absolute Activist Value 
Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto,148 for instance, the Second Circuit held 
that “to sufficiently allege a domestic securities transaction in 
securities not listed on a domestic exchange,” a plaintiff must “allege 
facts suggesting that irrevocable liability was incurred or title 
transferred within the United States.”149 
District courts within and outside the Second Circuit have begun 
to apply the Absolute Activist test. For example, the district court in 
Bayerische Landesbank v. Barclays Capital, Inc.150 denied a motion to 
dismiss, finding the plaintiffs made “at least a plausible showing that 
[the notes at issue] . . . were purchased by the New York branch,” 
which satisfied the issue of whether “irrevocable liability was incurred 
 
 144. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269–70. 
 145. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 146. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 
166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 147. See generally Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (holding that transactions involving securities that are not traded on a domestic 
exchange are domestic, and thus subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, if irrevocable 
liability is incurred or title passes within the United States); Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. 
v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
transfer of title of foreign securities with the United States may fall within the reach of 
10(b)). 
 148. 677 F.3d 60 (2nd Cir. 2012). 
 149. Id. at 68. 
 150. 902 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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or title was transferred within the United States” sufficiently to 
survive a motion to dismiss.151 Several months earlier, the same judge 
dismissed the claim in Pope Investments II, L.L.C. v. Deheng Law 
Firm,152 finding plaintiffs’ allegations that they “drafted the Securities 
Purchase Agreement, presumably in China” without “alleg[ing] 
where that agreement was negotiated or signed” were insufficient to 
avoid dismissal.153 Similarly, in MVP Asset Management (USA) L.L.C. 
v. Vestbirk,154 the court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims “that certain funds 
were transferred in between New York-based banking institutions,” 
finding them “insufficient to establish the existence of a domestic 
transaction.”155 The state of the law is, therefore, presently unsettled. 
Nonetheless, the trend of the case law is that defendants have 
arguments under procedural and substantive law to short-circuit the 
choice of a U.S. forum. 
In light of the current interpretations of the Morrison decision by 
federal courts and in light of heightened pleading standards required 
under federal procedural law, plaintiffs face substantial obstacles to 
filing transnational securities fraud claims in federal courts, but may 
face fewer obstacles in other fora, which are discussed below. 
State Law. Besides trying to plead around Morrison’s precise 
holding in federal court under federal law, other plaintiffs have filed 
cases under U.S. state securities laws in federal courts or in U.S. state 
courts.  
Two New York state court decisions highlight the trend. In Basis 
Yield Alpha Fund v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,156 a New York 
Supreme Court justice refused to dismiss a fraud claim brought 
against Goldman Sachs by an Australian hedge fund.157 The case was 
originally filed in federal district court the same month the Supreme 
Court decided Morrison.158 The federal court dismissed the suit 
following the Morrison decision, and plaintiffs filed a parallel case in 
state court alleging state law claims.159 The state law claims included a 
 
 151. Id. at 473 (quoting Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 
60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 152. No. 10 Civ. 6608(LLS), 2012 WL 3526621 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012). 
 153. Id. at *6–7. 
 154. MVP Asset Mgmt. v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483-GEB-CKD, 2012 WL 2873371 
(E.D. Cal. July 12, 2012). 
 155. Id. at *7. 
 156. No. 652996/2011, 961 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012). 
 157. Id. at *10. 
 158. Id. at *4. 
 159. Id. (acknowledging that the S.D.N.Y dismissed the same case “on the ground that 
the underlying transactions were not domestic securities transactions, and, therefore, not 
subject to federal securities laws”). 
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variety of common law claims, and while the court granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss on some of those claims, it denied the 
motion with respect to most of plaintiffs’ claims.160 
In Viking Global Equities, L.P. v. Porsche Automobil Holding 
SE,161 plaintiff hedge funds allegedly sustained losses as a result of 
misrepresentations made by Porsche relating to its intention to 
acquire shares in Volkswagen AG.162 Although plaintiffs initially 
survived a motion for summary judgment, the victory was short-lived. 
In December 2012, only a month after argument on Porsche’s appeal, 
the First Department of New York’s Appellate Division reversed the 
trial court, holding—in an opinion only two paragraphs long—that 
the plaintiffs were barred on the ground of forum non conveniens.163 
These two cases illustrate that plaintiffs continue to face 
substantial obstacles even when pleading state law claims. This will 
encourage plaintiffs to search for other favorable law and fora to 
bring cases. 
Foreign Law and Courts. To date, plaintiffs have had limited 
success under federal and state law. One might expect plaintiffs to 
plead foreign law in federal and state courts. Such cases would, 
however, be a prime candidates for forum non conveniens 
dismissal.164 In light of the likelihood of dismissal, it is not surprising 
that plaintiffs have sought foreign courts to plead foreign law, and 
they have begun to see some success. In short, a transnational law 
market has developed where foreign courts compete through their 
laws for transnational securities claims. 
At present, Canada and the Netherlands present favorable laws 
and fora for litigating transnational securities cases. Canada presents 
a compelling forum because it has recently enacted laws that are 
 
 160. Id. at *10. 
 161. 101 A.D.3d 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
 162. Id. at 641. 
 163. Id. at 640–41. 
 164. Forum non conveniens dismissals are most likely when a foreign plaintiff brings a 
case in a U.S. court and pleads foreign law. See Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes 
International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531, 1562 (2011) (analyzing the doctrine’s increased 
usage and impact). Other difficulties with pleading foreign law in U.S. courts would be the 
fact that foreign public laws are generally not enforceable in the United States and 
problems with the superiority element of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Linda J. Silberman, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for Global 
Securities Class Actions 11–14 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-41, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
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CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015) 
2015] ESCAPING FEDERAL LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL CASES 1021 
similar to section 10(b).165 In addition, in 2011, the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice declined to adopt a Morrison-like rule on global 
claims in Abdula v. Canadian Solar, Inc.166 Canada has also handled a 
global class action in Silver v. IMAX, Corp.167 In light of these recent 
cases, it is not surprising that since the Morrison decision, securities 
class action suits in Canada have been on the rise.168 
Between 2008 and 2010, twenty-seven new securities class actions 
were filed in Canada.169 In 2011, fifteen new security class actions 
were filed.170 In total, forty-five securities class actions are active in 
Canada, totaling $24.5 billion in claims.171 Of those claims, six are 
cross-border cases.172 With this jump, it appears that many of the 
claims previously brought in the United States have made their way 
across the northern border. Filings should be expected to increase in 
Canadian court because: 
(1) the impact of Morrison on claims in U.S. courts for non-U.S. 
investors in non-U.S. stocks (which makes Canada a more 
attractive venue for these cases), (2) the growth in the Canadian 
class action bar in terms of both firms and lawyers bringing and 
defending the cases, (3) Canadian rulings granting certification 
of global classes and giving plaintiffs leave to proceed, and (4) 
the success of class counsel in reaching multi-million dollar 
settlements in Canada (and class-counsel fee awards).173 
The Netherlands has also recently opened its doors to 
transnational litigation. For example, in 2005, the Netherlands 
enacted the Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade (“Collective 
Settlement of Mass Damages Act,” or “WCAM”), a statute that 
allows Dutch courts to settle—but not litigate—transnational disputes 
 
 165. See Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), available at http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e.htm. 
 166. 2011 ONSC 5105 para. 45 (Can.). 
 167. 2009 CanLII 72334 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
 168. Ashby Jones, Lawyers Looking to Canada for Shareholder Litigation, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 27, 2012, at B4. 
 169. John E. Black, Jr. & Ellen D. Jenkins, D & O Litigation Trends in 2010, IRMI (Mar. 
2011), http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2011/black03-directors-officers-insurance.aspx. 
 170. Bradley A. Heys & Mark L. Berenblut, Trends in Canadian Securities Class 
Actions: 2011 Update, NERA 1 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/ 
publications/archive2/PUB_Recent_Trends_Canada_2011_0412.pdf. 
 171. Id. 
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on a class-wide, opt-out basis.174 The WCAM is open not only to 
Dutch citizens, but also to citizens of other countries.175 In 2010, two 
months after Morrison, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals declared 
“an international collective settlement binding in a case where none 
of the potentially liable parties and only some of the potential 
claimants are domiciled in the Netherlands.”176 The potential for 
forum shopping to the Netherlands is obvious: such suits could 
involve plaintiffs whose securities transactions occurred both within 
and outside the United States. Because the Netherlands allows for 
class actions in limited circumstances and because its substantive law 
recognizes a variation of the fraud-on-the-market theory,177 suing in 
the Netherlands might be highly attractive.178 
In sum, contracting federal law has encouraged plaintiffs to seek 
state and foreign law and, in some cases, foreign courts, to bring their 
cases. In light of the foregoing, there is every reason to believe that 
this trend will continue in the years to come. As such, it will create the 
possibility of not only regulatory competition between fora but also 
regulatory overlap as various legal regimes are asked to adjudicate 
transnational cases. Transnational securities cases are but one 
example of this trend. The next subpart explores the possibility of 
increased regulatory competition in other areas of law. 
B. The Presumption’s Impact on U.S. Federal Law 
Cases filed in U.S. courts under the federal securities laws are 
not the only transnational cases impacted by the Morrison decision. 
Courts have also used the extraterritoriality rationale of Morrison in 
analyzing federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
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Thad Eagles, The Australian Alternative: A View from Abroad of Recent Developments in 
Securities Class Actions, 38 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1 (2015) (discussing Australia’s 
favorable class action regime for securities cases in particular). 
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Act (“RICO”) cases.179 Following Morrison, the Second Circuit has 
held that because “RICO is silent as to any extraterritorial 
application,” it does not have any “extraterritorial reach.”180 Courts 
have taken two principal approaches to determining whether an 
alleged RICO violation is domestic or foreign. The majority of courts 
to address the issue look at the location of the alleged RICO 
enterprise itself, as opposed to the location of the predicate acts of 
racketeering. For instance, Judge Rakoff explained the rationale for 
this approach in Cedeño v. Intech Group, Inc.181: 
RICO is not a recidivist statute designed to punish someone for 
committing a pattern of multiple criminal acts. Rather, it 
prohibits the use of such a pattern to impact an 
enterprise . . . . Thus, the focus of RICO is on the enterprise as 
the recipient of, or cover for, a pattern of criminal activity.182 
Courts that have looked at the location of the alleged RICO 
enterprise have generally applied a “nerve center” test. Under this 
test, an alleged RICO violation is deemed to occur at “the place 
where overall corporate policy originates or the nerve center from 
which it radiates out to its constituent parts and from which its 
officers direct, control and coordinate all activities without regard to 
locale, in the furtherance of the corporate objectives.”183 In analyzing 
the territoriality of an enterprise in a RICO complaint, the court 
should focus on that enterprise’s decisions that effectuate the 
relationships and common interests of its members.184 A minority of 
courts that have analyzed the application of Morrison to RICO have 
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 184. Id. 
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looked at the location of the predicate acts of racketeering in addition 
to the location of the alleged RICO enterprise.185  
One recent decision adopts a different approach. In European 
Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,186 the Second Circuit held that 
“RICO applies extraterritorially if, and only if, liability or guilt could 
attach to extraterritorial conduct under the relevant RICO 
predicate.”187 The court went on to hold that when the predicate 
statute itself manifests an “unmistakable congressional intent to apply 
extraterritorially, RICO will apply to extraterritorial conduct, too, but 
only to the extent that the predicate would.”188 In light of these 
diverging opinions, there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court 
will have to resolve the split in the near future. 
Another area of law impacted by Morrison is fraud actions under 
the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”).189 While the CEA 
resembles federal securities law, it does not have the same language 
of section 10(b) that limits claims to the “purchase or sale of a 
security.”190 However, two courts have found that the logic of 
Morrison extends to actions brought under the CEA and have 
required the plaintiff’s claims to allege facts that would satisfy the 
application of the CEA under Morrison and Absolute Activist’s 
irrevocable liability test.191 In both cases, the plaintiffs failed to plead 
sufficient facts to show that they incurred irrevocable liability within 
the United States.192 These cases show the extent that Morrison’s test 
and the development of case law applying Morrison’s principles can 
affect other areas that are similar to the federal securities laws 
originally at issue. 
Morrison has also impacted the antiretaliation provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,193 Asadi, a 
duel U.S. and Iraqi citizen, was a U.S.-based employee for G.E. 
Energy but was temporarily relocated to Jordan.194 Asadi claimed he 
learned that G.E. Energy was engaged in corrupt actions during a 
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negotiation for a lucrative Joint Venture Agreement with the Iraqi 
government.195 The alleged corruption involved the hiring of a woman 
“closely associated” with an Iraqi official.196 After learning of the 
hiring, Asadi reported the potential corruption to his superiors. He 
was later fired and brought suit.197 In analyzing his claim, the court 
found that Dodd-Frank was silent as to the extraterritorial application 
of the whistleblower provisions.198 Asadi argued that he was a U.S. 
employee and that the termination invoked U.S. at-will employment 
law, but the court held that the termination was in Jordan, relating to 
employment in Jordan, and the statute’s language was insufficient to 
bring the conduct within the Anti-Retaliation Provision of Dodd-
Frank.199 Other cases have followed this reasoning.200 Thus, even if an 
employee is under a U.S. employment contract, if his whistleblower 
actions occur abroad, he may find it difficult to apply the protections 
of Dodd-Frank after Morrison. 
The Morrison reasoning could also have an impact in antitrust, 
employment, and environmental cases.201 In light of the limited ability 
for plaintiffs to plead transnational cases under federal law, it is likely 
that plaintiffs will seek other fora in U.S. state and foreign courts. 
The next subpart focuses on the Supreme Court’s recently issued 
opinion in Kiobel and explores how the transnational law market may 
respond to it. 
C. Current and Evolving Impact: The Alien Tort Statute 
The effect of Morrison’s revival of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is evidenced by the Supreme Court’s recent opinion 
in Kiobel.202 In that case, the court addressed whether the ATS 
provided a cause of action for violations of the law of nations that 
occur in a foreign country.203 The plaintiffs, residents of Ogoniland, 
Nigeria, brought suit against Shell Petroleum Development Company 
of Nigeria (“SPDC”), incorporated in Nigeria, and its parents: Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Company, incorporated in the Netherlands, and 
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Shell Transport and Trading Company, incorporated in England.204 
The complaint alleged that SPDC utilized the Nigerian government to 
“violently suppress” environmental protests by the town.205 The 
Nigerian military and police forces allegedly attacked villages in the 
area “beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying 
or looting property.”206 The complaint also alleged that SPDC “aided 
and abetted” the Nigerian government by allowing the military to use 
SPDC property as a staging ground for these attacks, as well as 
providing food, transportation, and compensation to the military.207 
The plaintiffs were granted political asylum by the United States 
where they are now legal residents.208 They brought suit against SPDC 
alleging numerous law of nations violations stemming from the 
attacks in Ogoniland.209 
When the Supreme Court initially took the case, the Court was 
asked to decide whether corporations were subject to suit under the 
ATS.210 However, after oral argument, the Court took the atypical 
step of setting the case for re-argument and requested additional 
briefing on the question of whether the ATS could be applied 
extraterritorially.211 After this second round of briefing and argument, 
the Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied 
to the ATS.212 According to the Court, “all the relevant conduct took 
place outside the United States,” and the presumption could not be 
rebutted.213 Even if the ATS claims “touch and concern” conduct 
within the United States, that conduct “must do so with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application.”214 The fact that a corporation is present in the country 
would not be sufficient.215 Thus, the Court has substantially limited 
the ATS’s application to most transnational tort claims, allowing it 
only where this “sufficient force” exists.216 Indeed, since the Kiobel 
decision, most federal courts adjudicating cases have dismissed ATS 
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claims because the plaintiffs had not plausibly pled allegations 
involving significant unlawful activity in the United States.217 
In light of Kiobel’s holding, plaintiffs might seek out U.S. state 
law—in federal and state courts—and foreign law—in foreign 
courts—to plead transnational tort claims. In fact, many plaintiffs had 
already included state law claims in ATS litigation prior to Kiobel.218 
These claims appear in the form of the torts of wrongful death, 
battery, and assault—contrasted with their ATS counterparts of 
summary execution and torture.219 
Two cases are of note in predicting what future transnational tort 
litigation may look like in state court. In Doe v. Unocal Corp.,220 
plaintiffs refiled the pendent state claims arising from a pipeline 
project in Burma that were dismissed following the ATS dismissal in 
district court.221 The case went through discovery in state court and 
eventually settled prior to trial.222 In Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,223 the 
D.C. Circuit ruled that the ATS claims could proceed to trial along 
with the state law tort claims.224 After sua sponte staying proceedings 
while the Supreme Court considered Kiobel, it subsequently vacated 
its order as to the ATS claims and remanded the case to the district 
court for consideration of the ATS claims in light of Kiobel.225 In so 
doing, it expressly preserved the parts of its prior opinion that 
permitted the state law tort claims to proceed.226 In those parts of the 
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opinion, the court determined under choice of law rules that the law 
of Indonesia would apply.227 The case is presently pending before the 
D.C. federal district court.228 These cases illustrate how plaintiffs may 
find their way into U.S. courts using state tort law as opposed to ATS 
causes of action.229 
Notwithstanding Kiobel, it is possible for plaintiffs to plead state 
law claims in federal court under diversity230 or supplemental 
jurisdiction.231 A plaintiff would also be able to plead foreign law 
under these same doctrines. 
Plaintiffs might, however, prefer to bring suit under foreign law 
in foreign courts. As mentioned in the Introduction, a recent 
transnational tort case filed against a Dutch corporation for torts 
allegedly committed in Nigeria just reached a favorable judgment in 
the Netherlands. On January 30, 2013, a Nigerian subsidiary of Shell 
was held liable for damages in Nigeria based on Nigerian tort law.232 
At least two other countries, the United Kingdom and Canada, also 
present viable fora for such cases in the years to come. 
Recently, courts in the United Kingdom have resolved numerous 
ATS-like disputes. The results of these cases vary. One case in 
particular has reportedly settled, in part, for perhaps as much as $400 
million.233 Other cases have settled for many millions of dollars, 
including one case for $48 million.234 According to one keen observer 
of these trends, “the rate of settlement in the U.K. court is [] 
impressive” because “80% (four out of five) of its U.K. business 
human rights disputes litigated to a full conclusion [in the United 
Kingdom] have resulted in a payout. The comparable figure for U.S. 
corporate alien tort suits is 9.5%.”235 
The continuing impact of the Kiobel decision on the filing of 
transnational tort cases in the United States and elsewhere will take 
time to evaluate, depending on how plaintiffs and courts respond to 
the Court’s Kiobel decision. 
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As explained above, recent Supreme Court decisions restricting 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law in the securities 
and ATS contexts have encouraged plaintiffs to file transnational 
cases under state and foreign law and, in some cases, in state and 
foreign fora. These cases show the impact that limiting the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law can have on litigant 
choice. In the next Part, this Article examines other areas that point 
to a restrictive ethos in federal procedural and substantive law. These 
developments will also encourage litigants to seek other law and 
other fora to file transnational cases. 
III.  RESTRICTING TRANSNATIONAL CASES 
The transnational law market described above is not simply the 
reaction to one or two Supreme Court decisions regarding the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law. Rather, there is a 
significant movement generally in U.S. law towards restricting federal 
law and federal courts that will impact transnational litigation.236 In 
this Part, the Article takes a more systemic approach and analyzes the 
array of procedural devices, such as personal jurisdiction, pleading 
doctrine, class actions, and doctrines of discretion, utilized by U.S. 
federal courts to limit transnational cases. To the extent that these 
decisions constrict the ability of plaintiffs to avail themselves of U.S. 
federal fora in transnational cases, there will be an opportunity for 
other fora to compete to adjudicate and regulate transnational harms, 
which will be discussed in Part IV. 
A. Restricting Personal Jurisdiction 
As already noted, one of the key reasons why transnational 
plaintiffs are drawn to the United States is the belief that a liberal 
personal jurisdiction doctrine affords them the opportunity to bring 
suit here.237 The Supreme Court, however, has made it much more 
difficult to file transnational cases in U.S. courts when the defendant 
does not cause a harm or is not personally served within the forum 
state’s borders. 
In January 2014, the Court handed down its decision in Daimler 
AG v. Bauman.238 In that case, the Court was asked to decide whether 
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Daimler, a German corporation, could be sued based on general 
jurisdiction in California for alleged harms committed by one of its 
subsidiaries in Argentina during that country’s “Dirty War.”239 While 
the plaintiffs conceded that Daimler did not have the requisite 
contacts with California itself to sustain general jurisdiction, they 
creatively argued that another of Daimler’s subsidiaries, Mercedez-
Benz USA, could have its contacts with California attributed to 
Daimler to establish general jurisdiction.240 Surprisingly, the Court did 
not reach the question of attribution but took the opportunity to 
restate its view established in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown241 that general jurisdiction is only appropriate in a 
corporate defendant’s state of incorporation, principal place of 
business, or in an exceptional case in some other forum where the 
defendant is “essentially at home.”242 
In Goodyear, two North Carolina residents were killed in a bus 
accident in Paris, France, due to an allegedly defective tire 
manufactured in Turkey by a foreign subsidiary of Goodyear.243 
Plaintiffs argued that the North Carolina state court had general 
jurisdiction over the foreign defendants because the defendants sold 
their product in the United States, including in North Carolina where 
tens of thousands of tires were sent to the forum state between 2004 
and 2007.244 The Supreme Court reversed the court below, holding in 
a unanimous opinion that a corporation is only subject to suit in its 
principal place of business, state of incorporation, or another place 
where the corporation is “essentially at home in the forum state.”245 
In another case argued and decided the same day, J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,246 a New Jersey plaintiff was injured by a 
metal-shearing machine while working in New Jersey.247 The machine 
was manufactured in England, where the defendant was incorporated, 
and distributed in the United States through the English 
manufacturer’s independent Ohio distributor.248 Plaintiffs argued that 
the New Jersey state court had specific jurisdiction because the 
product was purposefully directed at the U.S. market and caused an 
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injury in New Jersey.249 Here again, the Court reversed the lower 
court, holding in a plurality opinion that the defendant must 
purposefully target a specific U.S. state to be subject to the forum’s 
jurisdiction.250 Because the manufacturer sold the machine through a 
U.S. distributer that sold throughout the United States and did not 
specifically target the forum state, jurisdiction was found wanting.251 
In these cases, the Court constricted the ability of plaintiffs to 
bring transnational cases as a matter of personal jurisdiction in the 
United States. In short, it will be much harder in years to come for 
foreign defendants in transnational cases to be sued in the United 
States, both in federal and state courts. Especially with regard to 
foreign corporations, plaintiffs will need to find a forum in the United 
States where there are substantial business contacts, such as in New 
York for most companies, given stocks and corporate presence. 
However, such an approach to personal jurisdiction, known as “doing 
business” jurisdiction, is presently unsettled.252 In the alternative, 
plaintiffs will have to bring suit against U.S. subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations and argue that the jurisdictional contacts of the 
subsidiary should be attributed to the parent.253 This area is equally 
unsettled.254 
Even in these cases, as discussed below, the forum non 
conveniens doctrine may continue to limit the availability of a U.S. 
forum. It appears, therefore, that transnational cases will be subject to 
personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts only in cases where the foreign 
defendant is “essentially at home” there or where the defendant 
purposefully targets the precise forum where the harm occurs, which 
means that the case involves a transnational defendant that has 
caused harm in a particular U.S. forum. The likelihood of filing a 
Kiobel or Morrison case—cases where there are foreign plaintiffs and 
foreign defendants being sued for foreign harms—is substantially 
limited in light of this recent case law. As discussed in the next 
subpart, other recent developments in federal procedural law also 
limit these types of cases. 
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B. Restricting Pleading Doctrine 
Recall that one reason why plaintiffs would bring suit in the 
United States is the belief that liberal discovery will help the plaintiff 
develop his case or perhaps encourage a settlement. Federal courts 
are also constricting access to discovery because a plaintiff is only 
entitled to discovery if she can survive a motion to dismiss. However, 
heightened pleading standards will limit the general availability of 
discovery in many transnational cases. 
Through two recent cases, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly255 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,256 the Court has instituted a plausibility pleading 
standard for cases filed in federal court. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure states that “a pleading must contain a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief.”257 After Twombly and Iqbal, the “short and plain 
statement” standard became harder to meet. Now, in general, a 
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts, accepted as true, and state a claim 
that is “plausible on its face.”258 In order for that claim to be plausible, 
the facts must be sufficient for the court to draw reasonable 
inferences that the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct.259 
Furthermore, those facts need to show more than a “sheer possibility” 
that the defendant is liable and the facts cannot be “merely consistent 
with a defendant’s liability.”260 Thus, plaintiffs must pass a higher bar 
in the pleading stage, “nudg[ing their] claims . . . across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.”261 
Lest there be any doubt, courts are requiring heightened 
pleading standards in transnational cases. After Morrison and Kiobel, 
for instance, courts struggled to determine what facts plaintiffs 
needed to plead in order to determine if the defendant’s conduct was 
extraterritorial. In the securities context, the leading case is Absolute 
Activist Value Master Fund v. Ficeto.262 The Second Circuit 
determined that Morrison required claims to fall within two 
categories to be domestic transaction subject to federal securities 
laws.263 First, transactions involving securities traded on domestic 
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exchanges would suffice.264 The second prong required the transaction 
itself to be domestic.265 For a transaction to be domestic and outside 
of Morrison’s extraterritoriality analysis, the complaint must allege 
that “irrevocable liability was incurred or that title was transferred 
within the United States,”266 that is, “when the parties become bound 
to effectuate the transaction.”267 
Several courts have adopted this approach to cases post-
Morrison.268 Thus in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the pleading 
must “allege facts leading to the plausible inference of a domestic 
transaction.”269 This approach brings its own difficulties for plaintiffs. 
In a world of transnational business, plaintiffs alleging fraud must 
spend the resources to find sufficient facts to plead that the 
transaction was domestic under the “irrevocable liability” test. 
The same pleading difficulties can be seen in the ATS context as 
well. In In re South African Apartheid Litigation,270 the court found it 
was possible for the plaintiffs to plead a private act of apartheid with 
the “requisite degree of specificity.”271 However, such a claim was not 
widely recognized, and the court refused to allow it.272 The difficulty 
in pleading with specificity is that ATS litigation requires the tort be 
recognized as a violation of the law of nations.273 
Therefore, plaintiffs face two difficulties in pleading ATS claims. 
First, plaintiffs must develop a theory (and elements) to sustain a 
cause of action under a tort in violation of the law of nations, and they 
must also do so with sufficient particularity. Second, plaintiffs must 
plead “that the actions of [the foreign defendants] touch and concern 
the United States with sufficient force to rebut the presumption 
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against the extraterritorial reach of the ATS.”274 In compliance with 
Iqbal and Twombly, the facts they plead must also be plausible and 
not mere conclusions or assertions. This difficulty may cause ATS 
plaintiffs to forum shop away from U.S. federal courts in search of 
fora where pleadings need not comport with such stringent standards. 
Alternative courts include state and foreign courts. 
As such, plaintiffs will not only face significant hurdles in 
pleading their claims, but also may not have the benefit of discovery 
in hopes of ferreting out wrongdoing.275 Similarly, defendants will 
have increased bargaining position when it comes to settlement 
decisions in light of the fact that discovery, and the costs associated 
with it, might be avoided. 
C. Restricting Class Actions 
The possibility of aggregate litigation is another reason why 
transnational plaintiffs would seek out U.S. courts. Class actions are, 
however, being restricted in the United States. To begin with, 
Congress has limited the reach of class actions through the Class 
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),276 which amended the federal 
diversity statute to allow parties to move class actions out of state 
court and into federal court.277 While the reasons for passing this 
statute were many, a significant reason was the belief that sending 
state class actions to federal judges makes class certification less 
likely.278 
Even putting aside CAFA, class action certification is 
increasingly subject to heightened standards in light of the Court’s 
recent decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.279 In Dukes, the court reviewed 
the class certification of a case against Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest 
private employer, brought by more than one and a half million female 
employees who alleged gender discrimination under Title VII over 
pay and promotions.280 The plaintiffs alleged the discrimination was 
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common to all Wal-Mart female employees, based on a “corporate 
culture” that allowed bias against women.281 The Court took the case 
to review whether the class complied with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(a) and its four requirements: numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequate representation.282 
The case turned on the commonality requirement—whether the 
plaintiffs showed that “there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class.”283 Commonality requires that every class member 
“suffer[ed] the same injury,” beyond merely a violation under the 
same law.284 The requirement means that the claims “must depend 
upon a common contention,” such as bias by the same supervisor.285 
Furthermore, that common contention must be capable of class-wide 
resolution—the contention’s resolution will resolve an issue central to 
every individual claim “in one stroke.”286 A class-action plaintiff 
cannot merely plead a case meeting the Rule 23 requirements.287 The 
Court requires that the plaintiff must prove that the requirements are 
met “in fact.”288 
Here, the Court determined the record showed only one 
common policy—local supervisor discretion over employment 
matters, which would establish a discriminatory environment.289 
However, the Court concluded that a local discretionary policy 
worked against the plaintiff’s contention that there was a common 
employment practice, which the plaintiffs needed to meet the 
commonality requirement.290 Furthermore, even recognizing that such 
claims “can exist does not lead to the conclusion that every employee 
in a company using a system of discretion has such a claim in 
common.”291 The Court found that there was “no convincing proof” 
of a company-wide discriminatory policy.292 Because the plaintiffs 
could not show that the class certification would lead to a common 
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question on such a policy, the Court reversed the certification of the 
class.293 
Dukes restricted the use of the class-action vehicle unless the 
plaintiff class can meet this rigorous requirement. The class cannot 
merely plead that the Rule 23 requirements are met, but must also 
show they are met with “convincing proof” if they are to survive as a 
class.294 Because of these requirements, it is likely that transnational 
plaintiffs will face heightened procedural bars to filing their cases as 
class actions in the United States. Other more flexible procedural 
doctrines also present themselves as obstacles for transnational 
plaintiffs and are discussed in the next subsection. 
D. Restrictive Doctrines of Discretion 
Courts might also use other doctrines to limit transactional cases. 
There has been a significant increase in forum non conveniens 
decisions in federal courts in recent years. Between 1990 and 2006, 
there were roughly 691 (about 43 per year) reported transnational 
forum non conveniens decisions by federal courts.295 Overall, the 
courts dismissed in favor of a foreign forum in about 50% of these 
cases.296 In cases involving a foreign plaintiff, the dismissal rate was 
higher, at 63%.297 Foreign plaintiffs are “twice as likely to have their 
suits dismissed” compared to domestic plaintiffs.298 
Forum non conveniens motions may increase in future years in 
light of recent Supreme Court precedent encouraging the doctrine’s 
 
 293. Id. at 2561. 
 294. See Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(determining that a Dukes argument was premature at the motion to dismiss or strike 
stage because the relevant inquiry is whether it was plausible); see also Calibuso v. Bank of 
Am. Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 374, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[I]t is plausible that plaintiffs will 
come forth with sufficient evidence at the class certification stage to demonstrate 
commonality.”); Barghout v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms., No. 11-cv-15761, 2012 WL 
1113973, at *10, *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012) (finding that a motion to dismiss should be 
denied where plaintiffs had plausibly alleged a disparate impact claim based on company-
wide promotion and pay policies). 
 295. Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial 
Governance: The Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033. 
 296. Id. at 16. 
 297. Whytock, supra note 10, at 503. This is likely accounted for by the fact that in 
conducting the forum non conveniens analysis, a court may give less deference to a foreign 
plaintiff’s choice of forum under Supreme Court case law. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 
U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981) (“When the home forum [is] chosen, it is reasonable to assume 
that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign . . . this assumption is . . . less 
reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure 
that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.”). 
 298. Whytock, supra note 10, at 503–04.  
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015) 
2015] ESCAPING FEDERAL LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL CASES 1037 
use.299 Besides increased invocation of forum non conveniens, many 
federal district courts have applied other doctrines like international 
comity, the political question doctrine, and exhaustion that might 
limit the ability of transnational cases to go forward.300 Taken 
together, it is likely that courts may use these doctrines to restrict 
transnational cases. 
The closing of federal courthouse doors brought about through 
federal extraterritoriality decisions as well as other federal procedural 
movements potentially creates opportunities for other fora to 
prescribe and adjudicate transnational harms. This outcome has the 
potential to move litigants away from federal law in federal courts 
and towards other law—state and foreign—in other fora—including 
state and foreign. We may thus see a brave new world of 
transnational litigation where litigation occurs (1) in federal courts 
under state and foreign law, (2) in U.S. state courts under state and 
foreign law, and (3) in foreign courts under foreign law. In the next 
Part, the Article explains how courts should account for the 
transnational law market. 
IV.  A NEW APPROACH TO THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW MARKET 
While it may be too early to take full account of the substantive 
and procedural trends that compromise a foreign plaintiff’s ability to 
file a transnational case in U.S. federal courts, one can examine 
prospectively the impact that this movement of restricting federal 
court access will have on transnational litigation beyond federal 
courts and law. Such an examination is timely and important. It is 
timely given the Supreme Court’s recent Morrison decision, which 
has impacted a wide swath of federal statutes, and the decision in 
Kiobel, which has the potential to change the way transnational 
human rights litigation is conducted in the United States. It is 
 
 299. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007). 
 300. See, e.g., Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 2005) 
(“This case must also be dismissed because it interferes with the foreign policy of the 
United States of America . . . . For this court to preclude sales of Caterpillar products to 
Israel would be to make a foreign policy decision and to impinge directly upon the 
prerogatives of the executive branch of government.”); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[T]he State Department has filed a 
Statement of Interest outlining several areas of foreign policy that would be negatively 
impacted by proceeding with the instant case . . . . [P]roceeding with the litigation would 
indicate a ‘lack of respect’ for the Executive’s preferred approach of handling the Santo 
Domingo bombing and relations with Colombia in general.”); In re Nazi Era Cases 
Against Ger. Defendants Litig., 334 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695–96 (D.N.J. 2004) (“[T]he political 
question doctrine counsels the Court to dismiss this action . . . . If this Court adjudicated 
the Complaint, it would do so against the recommendation of the Executive Branch.”). 
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important because legal scholarship in this area to date has focused 
almost entirely on federal law as applied by federal courts.301 
Examining state and foreign law in federal, state, and foreign courts 
presents a fresh look at the role of transnational law in domestic 
courts and points to future battlegrounds for litigants, courts, and 
scholars. 
In light of the Morrison and Kiobel decisions, it is likely that 
many transnational securities and tort cases will not be subject to suit 
in federal court under federal law. Combining this realization with 
empirical evidence demonstrating a significant decline in 
transnational litigation generally in federal courts,302 as well as the 
doctrines discussed above restricting court access in other areas of 
federal procedural law, it is arguable that a significant number of 
transnational cases will not be litigated in federal court under federal 
law. Will these cases simply go away or will they escape federal law 
for other law and fora? And, what happens when transnational cases 
escape federal law? 
As discussed above, in the wake of the Morrison decision, 
plaintiffs filed nearly identical state law claims alleging fraud or other 
violations of state statutory and common law to escape the limits 
imposed on them by federal law.303 Some of these cases were filed in 
federal court under diversity jurisdiction,304 while others were filed 
directly in state courts.305 Some of these state court cases will, of 
course, be subject to removal306 and thus, reenter a federal procedural 
system that poses significant obstacles to litigating the case. In those 
cases, federal courts will again be asked to adjudicate transnational 
cases under U.S. state and foreign law. Will the courts so adjudicate, 
or will they use forum non conveniens and other doctrines to short-
 
 301. See, e.g., Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of 
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 538 (2011); 
Alex Reed, But I’m an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing F-Squared 
Securities Fraud Claims After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
515, 515 (2012). But see Florey, supra note 26, at 539 (examining the rise of state law claims 
in transnational cases).  
 302. Whytock, supra note 10, at 510. 
 303. See Ahn v. C2 Educ. Sys., No. CL–2011–615, 2012 WL 1856475, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
2012) (asserting claims in state court under the Virginia Securities Act, which is identical 
to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act). 
 304. See King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 
338 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (pleading common law fraud against securities rating agencies with 
respect to ratings for a collapsed structured investment vehicle). 
 305. Carclucci v. Han, 886 F. Supp. 2d 497, 527–28 (E.D. Va. 2012) (claims under 
Virginia Securities Act brought in diversity jurisdiction dismissed due to heightened 
pleading standards). 
 306. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012). 
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circuit the plaintiff’s forum shopping? Some cases, however, will not 
be subject to removal, and this will thrust U.S. state courts into 
transnational securities litigation. Finally, some cases will be filed 
abroad,307 either because of dismissals in federal or state court or 
because of forum and law shopping. Recent filings in foreign fora 
confirm the attractiveness of foreign courts today, even though in the 
past plaintiffs were seemingly drawn to U.S. courts “Like Moths To a 
Flame.”308 
Such an outcome may be appropriate. It might be the case that a 
constricted U.S. approach to transnational litigation is in accord with 
the original design for the federal courts. Yet, thrusting transnational 
cases into state courts risks creating discord in an important area of 
international relations that requires the speaking of “one voice” by 
the federal government.309 It may also be the case that sending these 
cases abroad will have unforeseen consequences. These movements 
to escape federal law will push lawmaking powers to other courts. 
The impact that this will have on U.S. law, foreign law, and judicial 
decisionmaking is in need of examination. 
As detailed in the previous parts, there arguably exists a 
transnational law market that will impact litigation before federal, 
state, and foreign courts. As the exploration of the market’s impact 
on securities litigation post-Morrison and on transnational tort 
litigation post-Kiobel showed, litigants respond to restrictive federal 
and procedural law by seeking out other courts—state and foreign—
and other law—state and foreign—to plead transnational cases. As 
litigants seek out other fora, it is to be expected that state and foreign 
fora will compete for these cases by opening their doors to litigation 
foreclosed in federal court. For instance, while American class action 
procedures remain uncommon, many countries have recently adopted 
mass aggregation rules that substantially overlap with U.S. 
procedures.310 Part of the reason for this change in foreign law might 
be that plaintiffs are now seeking out these fora on account of limited 
federal law to reach their claims. 
 
 307. See, e.g., Abdula v. Canadian Solar, 2011 ONSC 5105 (Can.); Black & Jenkins, 
supra note 169. 
 308. Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation 
After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court’s “Transaction Test,” 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 
411–15 (2012) (explaining both substantive and procedural reasons that plaintiffs were 
drawn to U.S. courts). 
 309. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (“[T]he Federal 
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign 
governments.”). 
 310. See Strong, supra note 35, at 954–60. (describing aggregate litigation in Europe).  
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One might also speculate that in future years, foreign law might 
adopt remedial and procedural schemes similar to U.S. practice to 
accommodate such cases. The evidence points beyond speculation. 
First, foreign legal systems are beginning to issue damages awards 
that rival, even if they do not surpass, U.S. awards.311 Second, foreign 
legal systems have begun to employ aggregate litigation or collective 
action mechanisms similar to U.S. class actions.312 Third, foreign 
systems now permit alternative litigation funding structures.313 This 
development both facilitates transnational litigation in foreign courts 
and reflects the growth of high-stakes litigation abroad.314 Finally, 
“foreign courts recognize jurisdiction over foreign defendants in ways 
that are as expansive or even more so than American courts.”315 
Several developments are thus in play. First, foreign courts are 
changing their substantive and procedural laws to encourage the 
litigation of transnational claims before their courts. Second, these 
changes are occurring both at the level of substance and procedure. 
Third, there is reason to believe that these cases may in fact end up, 
once again, in the United States. Once the plaintiffs secure a 
favorable judgment abroad, the plaintiffs may seek enforcement of 
the judgment before U.S. courts.316 When reviewing requests for 
enforcement, U.S. courts have traditionally employed a confined 
approach that does not permit the U.S. court to retry the case.317 
Rather, a U.S. court will generally enforce the foreign judgment so 
long as there are not systemic, due process, or public policy issues 
with judgment enforcement.318 U.S. courts may have closed their 
courthouse doors through restricting procedural and substantive law. 
 
 311. See KELEMEN, supra note 33, at 74; Behrens et al., supra note 34, at 192–93.  
 312. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come 
to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 202 (2009); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation 
Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21–25 
(2009).  
 313. See, e.g., Behrens et al., supra note 34, at 183–87; Robertson, supra note 85, at 
161–62. 
 314. These developments parallel increasing legal costs in Europe. When compared to 
European countries or Canada, the United States has “the highest liability costs as a 
percentage of GDP,” but “liability costs in the U.K., Germany and Denmark have risen 
between 13% and 25% per year since 2008.” DAVID L. MCKNIGHT & PAUL J. HINTON, 
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF 
LITIGATION COSTS: EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/NERA_FULL.pdf.  
 315. Bookman, supra note 236.  
 316. See Shill, supra note 80, at 462 (explaining the dynamics of enforcement of foreign 
judgments).  
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 493–95. 
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To the extent foreign courts respond by developing their substantive 
and procedural law to allow such claims, U.S. courts, through 
enforcement proceedings, now may become the handmaiden of this 
transnational forum shopping through judgment enforcement. 
Federal courts cannot close their doors to transnational cases 
without having a significant impact on the development of law in 
other fora. Traditionally, federal doctrine has had little concern for 
the impact that closure has on other fora. Yet, one must ask an 
important question at the heart of transnational litigation: Should 
U.S. courts make the decision to reject transnational cases without 
concern for the impact that will have on the transnational law 
market? Failure to consider the impact on the market will risk 
unleashing a brave new world of transnational litigation where 
litigants demand that courts compete for these cases. The end result 
will not only be jurisdictional conflict, but also, perhaps more 
problematic, forum competition where fairness and access to justice 
are subsumed in a market for law. In the following sections, I propose 
a new approach to the transnational law market to take account of 
these concerns. 
A. Why Are Federal Courts Restricting Access? 
Before proposing a different approach, it is helpful to take 
account of some of the reasons that U.S. federal courts have 
employed the above doctrines to limit access in transnational cases. 
There is no doubt that judicial concern with excessive litigation and 
case management has driven many of the contractions identified 
above, especially those in the context of pleading and class actions. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has restricted federal law because it 
questions the expansive costs of litigation.319 The Supreme Court is 
 
 319. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (“So when the 
allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, 
this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and 
money by the parties and the court.” (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 233–34 (3d ed. 2004) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) 
(“[Insufficient pleadings] would permit a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply 
take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in 
terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonable founded hope that 
the discovery process will reveal relevant evidence.” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Car Carriers, 
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he costs of modern federal 
antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against 
sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs 
can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint.”); Asahi Glass Co. v. 
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cognizant of the practicalities of litigation, specifically noting three 
concerns: discovery is costly, abuse is possible, and settlements are 
sometimes unjustified.320 Another reason is judicial efficiency. In the 
face of a presumed “docket explosion,” federal courts are increasingly 
using procedural mechanisms to limit the cases they ultimately 
hear.321 As explained above, one can safely say that there is a general 
hesitancy on the part of federal courts to adjudicate not just 
transnational cases, but domestic cases also. 
Yet, something additional is at work in the specific context of 
transnational litigation that better explains the application of these 
restrictive doctrines in transnational cases. Courts are reluctant to 
interfere with the sovereignty of other nations. Additionally, courts 
do not wish to interfere with foreign policy matters for fear of 
creating international discord.322 The Court certainly fears engaging in 
acts of “legal imperialism” unless specifically directed to do so by the 
legislative branch.323 
This policy of deference to the political branches in foreign 
affairs certainly underlies much of the restrictive transnational 
jurisprudence discussed above. For instance, the Court has revitalized 
the presumption against extraterritoriality to ensure that it will only 
engage in international conflicts when explicitly directed to do so by 
Congress.324 By limiting foreign plaintiffs’ access to federal courts 
through the presumption against extraterritoriality and other 
procedural doctrines, the Court has also accomplished the goal of 
limiting judicial interference in international affairs. Yet, as discussed 
above, this contraction will shunt transnational cases to state and 
foreign law and state and foreign courts. As state and foreign courts 
 
Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by 
designation) (“[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before a 
patent antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted 
discovery phase.”). 
 320. See Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 347; Arthur Miller, Are the Federal 
Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 597 (2011). 
 321. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Access to Justice Within the Federal Courts—A Ninth 
Circuit Perspective, 90 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1047–49 (2012) (“Rather than being able to 
assimilate those changes in caseload, just to keep their heads above water, the federal 
courts have been forced to rely increasingly on procedural mechanisms.”). 
 322. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“The 
presumption against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the Judiciary does not 
erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences 
not clearly intended by the political branches.”). 
 323. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004). 
 324. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 256–57 (2010). 
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hear these cases, new issues will arise that will create the potential for 
international discord.325 
B. The Need for a Different Approach 
In this section, the Article briefly outlines a new approach to the 
transnational law market based on sovereign interests. As explained 
above, a significant reason for the restriction of federal court access in 
transnational cases has to do with the perceived impact on foreign 
sovereign interests and international relations. This approach that 
follows aims to enlist courts and policy makers as active participants 
in a transnational legal system that takes account of the transnational 
law market by regulatory coordination as opposed to federal judicial 
abstention and transnational forum shopping. 
1. A Sovereign-Interest Approach 
As a matter of policy, it is arguable that the restrictive ethos 
discussed above is being applied in transnational cases in order to 
avoid “unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of 
other nations.”326 Much like the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, restricting federal court access in transnational 
cases generally “serves to protect against unintended clashes between 
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international 
discord.”327 The “primary source of that conflict is differences in 
substance between the law applied and the law of the other country 
or countries involved, particularly when conduct permitted where it 
occurred is prohibited where it has effect.”328 
The key functional concerns are as follows. First, there is a 
concern that litigating transnational cases in U.S. courts might 
interfere with other, foreign measures to regulate or address the harm 
in question. Second, there appears to be some concern that private 
lawsuits may be inappropriate means to pursue the regulatory and 
public policy goals of much transnational litigation. 
The key to resolving these functional concerns is to refocus the 
court-access doctrines discussed above on state consent. To do this, 
courts should seek to determine the precise sovereign interests at 
 
 325. According to Pamela Bookman, these doctrines have done little to accomplish 
their stated goals and may in fact have negative implications for U.S. parties—both 
plaintiff and defendant—as well as U.S. sovereign interests. Bookman, supra note 236.  
 326. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 164. 
 327. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 328. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 
270 (2006). 
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stake by seeking the input of the sovereigns implicated by a court’s 
decision.329 Such an approach would encourage coordination between 
the United States and foreign sovereigns and has the potential to 
minimize externalities created by the transnational law market. 
First, one way to accomplish this goal is to narrow a plaintiff’s 
jurisdictional choices. One reason that the transnational law market 
encouraged the filing of suits in the United States was the perception 
that U.S. law permitted expansive assertions of jurisdictions. As noted 
above, other legal systems may now permit similarly expansive 
jurisdiction. Restricting jurisdictional choice has largely been 
accomplished in the United States through the Supreme Court’s 
recent general jurisdiction decisions that require a transnational 
defendant to be “at home” in the United States. In so doing, the 
Supreme Court has made it possible as a matter of jurisdiction to 
bring transnational cases only against U.S. defendant domiciliaries, 
unless there is specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant 
domiciliary. This approach does much to permit assertions of 
jurisdiction in the United States only when there is a substantial 
connection with the United States and the given forum for suit. 
However, such an approach will only work if other countries 
adopt similar rules. As noted above, foreign legal systems may be 
expanding their jurisdictional rules even beyond what has been 
regarded as relatively permissive U.S. jurisdictional doctrines. Yet, 
there may be potential for regulatory cooperation. 
The Brussels I Regulation Recast provides a useful example. 
Under the Regulation, the starting principle is that a defendant 
domiciled in a contracting state should generally be sued in the courts 
of that state.330 Domiciliaries of contracting states may only be sued in 
the courts of other contracting states if one of the Regulation rules 
permits.331 For example, the permissible bases of jurisdiction are such 
that in matters of contract the suit may be brought in the place of 
performance.332 In matters of tort, suit may be brought where the 
harmful act occurred.333 This is understood as covering both the place 
where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to 
 
 329. See id. at 308–09 (“For transnational litigation to become an effective element in 
global economic regulation, the consent of the other countries involved . . . is necessary.”). 
 330. Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7. 
 331. Id. at art. 5, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7. 
 332. Id. at art. 7, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7. 
 333. Id.  
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015) 
2015] ESCAPING FEDERAL LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL CASES 1045 
it. In respect to disputes arising out of the operation of a branch office 
or agency, suit may proceed in the place where the branch or agency 
is located.334 And in actions in rem, the state where the property is 
located has exclusive jurisdiction.335 Under these rules, contracting 
states are prohibited from exercising judicial jurisdiction against 
domiciliaries of other contracting states on exorbitant bases. 
Based on these provisions, it can be said that the acceptable 
bases for adjudicatory jurisdiction are domicile, consent, acts or 
effects occurring in the nation, and ownership or possession of 
property. 
It is important to note that these jurisdictional rules only apply to 
defendants domiciled in European Union member states. For suits 
against non-member-state-party domiciliaries, the law of the state 
where the suit is brought determines.336 Thus, additional regulatory 
cooperation is needed to both model the approach of the Brussels I 
Regulation Recast, as well as to fill holes left for non-member-state-
party domiciliaries. 
Second, further governmental involvement in transnational cases 
could be encouraged. Such involvement should be encouraged and 
solicited by courts and parties in transnational cases.337 By 
encouraging this involvement, courts and parties will recognize and 
embrace the fact that disputes between private litigants have 
important ramifications for sovereign interests as well as public 
policy.338 Courts can better address these functional concerns by 
encouraging sovereigns to precisely explain their interests in 
transnational cases. There should be a strong presumption that courts 
will apply forum law and exercise jurisdiction in transnational cases 
absent compelling and articulated sovereign concerns to the contrary. 
As extensions of the forum sovereign, courts should be reluctant to 
shirk the obligation to apply forum law.339 Likewise, courts should be 
cautious about needlessly relinquishing jurisdiction given that there is 
 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at art. 24, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 10. 
 336. See id. at art. 5, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7. 
 337. In addition to statements of interest and briefs, the U.S. government, as well as 
foreign governments, sometimes file letters with courts regarding pending cases. See, e.g., 
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 764–65 (1972) (plurality 
opinion). 
 338. Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A 
Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 404 (2003). 
 339. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1015 (1991) 
(“Judges are, after all, agents of the state’s citizenry and lawmakers, and their paramount 
responsibility must be the implementation of the state’s own law.”). 
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a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise a court’s jurisdiction in 
cases before them.340 Courts should, of course, be concerned with the 
nuanced international relations issues present in specific transnational 
cases. But such a concern should not encourage a court at the first 
instance to disregard the necessity of ascertaining the precise 
sovereign interests at stake in its exercise of jurisdiction. 
2. Outcomes 
The primary outcome of the above approach would be the 
encouragement of courts to explicitly describe their reasons for 
adjudicating transnational cases in such a way that illuminates the 
sovereign interests at stake. In so doing, the democratic-enhancing 
function of the judicial process is brought to the forefront of judicial 
decisionmaking. Courts have important democratic functions to carry 
out as extensions of the sovereign and, in the case of the United 
States, of the people for whom the sovereign speaks. Through this 
approach, courts, parties, and sovereigns will be prevented from 
obscuring complex issues of international relations behind the 
nomenclature of law. The sovereign interests at stake will be sought 
and articulated and the democratic branches of government will be 
provided with an important check on judicial decision-making in 
transnational cases. Likewise, the public grappling with these 
important issues will perhaps encourage further democratic activity, 
such as congressional action in important areas of transnational 
litigation that touches on international relations. Finally, this 
approach has the potential to mitigate concerns present in the 
transnational law market by replacing litigant demand and forum 
competition with sovereign interests. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has described and analyzed a brave new world of 
transnational litigation where litigants forum shop for favorable law 
as fora compete for legal cases. Reconceptualizing transnational 
litigation as a transnational law market enables one to see the myriad 
ways in which procedural and substantive law enable and frustrate 
forum choice in transnational cases. Viewed in this light, decisions by 
U.S. federal courts to limit transnational cases must be viewed not 
only for the effect that such rules have domestically in federal courts, 
but also in terms of the likely impact they will have on the filing of 
 
 340. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 
(1976). 
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cases under state and foreign law in state and foreign courts. Forum 
choice and competition impact these cases, and additional scrutiny 
should be given to whether jurisdictional constriction on the part of 
U.S. federal courts is appropriate in light of the transnational law 
market identified above. Furthermore, courts, legislators, and 
governments should begin to examine the possibilities for 
transnational regulatory cooperation with specific regard for the 
sovereign interests at stake in many transnational cases. 
  
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015) 
1048 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
 
